Table 4: The direct returns to a political career, robustness

	6th decile	8th decile	7th decile, excluding:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Top 2	Top 3	Top 4	Top 5
Below $\underline{w}$						
Prob. mayor - *nat.*	-0.054	0.014	0.0004	0.008	-0.002	-0.011
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.170)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.165)
Prob. mayor - *imm.*	-2.309***	-2.613***	-2.438***	-2.434***	-2.451***	-2.451***
	(0.283)	(0.276)	(0.274)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Above $\underline{w}$						
Prob. mayor - *nat.*	2.037***	2.365**	1.714***	1.513***	1.328***	1.130***
	(0.502)	(1.004)	(0.560)	(0.504)	(0.442)	(0.361)
Prob. mayor - *imm.*	0.448	1.329**	0.953**	0.816	0.481	0.283
	(0.537)	(0.574)	(0.464)	(0.503)	(0.566)	(0.621)
Rel. mayor wage - *nat.*	0.042	0.174***	0.124**	0.120**	0.129**	0.094*
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Rel. mayor wage - *imm.*	0.150**	0.275***	0.084*	0.085*	0.097*	0.087*
	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Oslo excluded	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,365,268	6,365,268	4,991,727	4,715,606	4,523,152	4,360,960

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Individuals in the age group 24-63 and we pool 3 election years 2007, 2011 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: Variables are standardized using national mean and standard deviation. Other controls include immigrant, education, gender, age, marital, employment and municipality population (5) dummies. Top n excluded refers to the number of largest cities (population-wise) excluded from the regression following this order: 1. Oslo, 2. Bergen, 3. Trondheim, 4. Stavanger, 5.Borum. Below and above $\underline{w}$ refers respectively to whether the mayor's relative average wage is below or above the 6th/7th/8th decile of the distribution of mayor wages computed for each election year separately. Probability to run rescaled between 0 and 100.The estimated coefficients are the marginal effects of each variable, separately for natives and immigrants.

Additionally, our results indicate that higher relative wages earned by professional politicians lead to a higher individual likelihood of running for office. In this section, we check the robustness of our results to the manipulation of the threshold used to define "sufficiently high" relative mayor wages, to the exclusion of the largest Norwegian cities, and to restricting attention to individuals who run for office in a bolded position on the list and therefore have realistic expectations of being elected. Our model does not provide a directly measurable indicator for the size of the threshold. In our baseline analysis in Section 5.2, we set it at the 7th decile of the national distribution of relative mayor wages. Our results are robust to alternative thresholds, as shown in Table 4. In particular, columns (1) and (2) report results from specifications in which the threshold is set at the 6th and the 8th decile, respectively, and show that our key results are essentially unaffected.

Our simple model captures the short-term trade-off faced by individuals seeking a seat on local

councils, but it does not explicitly account for the fact that in large municipalities, election to local councils may be an investment in a future career in national politics. For this reason, in Section 5.2, we presented estimates that exclude Oslo from the sample. Since Oslo is not the only large city in Norway, in columns (3) to (6) of Table 4, we assess the robustness of our estimates to the additional exclusion of the second (Bergen, column 3), third (Trondheim, column 4), fourth (Stavanger, column 5) and fifth (Borum, column 6) largest Norwegian cities. The results are, again, in this case broadly unaffected.

Finally, as we previously discussed, bolded candidates are much more likely to be elected than other individuals running for office, and hence, we expect the incentives highlighted in our model to be more powerful for bolded candidates. To assess whether this is the case, in Table A.2, we focus on bolded candidates. As we can see in columns (1) and (2), all of our model's predictions are confirmed, regardless of whether we include Oslo in the sample. Moreover, columns (3)-(6) of the table also show that these results are robust to the alternative choice of the 6th (columns 3 and 4) or 8th (columns 5 and 6) decile as the relevant threshold for the wages of full-time politicians.

8   Conclusions

As more immigrants make destination countries their new homes, understanding the determinants of their under-representation in the political process is becoming increasingly important. In this paper, we studied this issue by focusing on a country – Norway – that has experienced a large inflow of immigrants over the past 20 years and has generous provisions to extend the franchise in local elections to foreign nationals.

Using a unique dataset covering the universe of individuals running for local elections between 2007 and 2015, we documented the patterns of selection into office-seeking for natives and the foreign born. We then proposed a simple forward-looking Roy model of the candidate entry decision, highlighting the crucial role played by the returns to labour market experience. Consistent with the predictions of the model, our empirical analysis showed that differentials in the returns to labour market experience between immigrants and natives – across a variety of subgroups of the population – mirror the observed selection patterns. This finding thus highlights that economic and political integration are closely intertwined – a conclusion that to the best of our knowledge provides new insights into the complex process through which immigrants adapt to life in the host country.

We can think of at least two directions for further research. Our stylized theoretical model focused on the trade-off between entering politics and remaining active in the labour market. It did not explicitly consider the possibility that undertaking a political career might have repercussions

for subsequent labour market opportunities, for example through the acquisition of new human capital or the development of a larger social network. Given the narrow focus of our analysis on local elections, the extent to which these types of considerations will shape the decision to run for office is unclear, but exploring their role and the extent to which it might differ between immigrants and natives is potentially very relevant.

A large literature – see Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Cascio and Washington (2014), and Bernini, Facchini, and Testa (2018), to name a few of the recent contributions – has documented that policy choices at the local level are likely affected by some salient attribute of the elected official in charge. Using our rich data on the migration backgrounds of local councillors and mayors and the rich set of services that are under the control of municipal governments in Norway, it would be interesting to investigate whether foreign-born politicians favour different policy choices than their native counterparts and, if so, which interventions would they emphasize. While both are important questions, we leave them for future research.

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A Appendix

A.1 Positive returns to a political career

In the baseline theoretical analysis, we assumed that embarking on a political career involved a cost in terms of forgone labour market earnings in the second period if the councillor did not become a full-time politician. The model can easily be extended to also consider the case in which embarking on a political career actually enhances labour market earnings, i.e., $1 < \theta < \frac{1}{1-\pi}$. It is easy to show that the result in Proposition 1 continues to hold.

Regarding proposition 2, our main result , namely part *i.)*, continues to hold. Regarding part *ii.)*, if $\theta > 1$, then $\frac{\partial E[Run_i]}{\partial \pi} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial (E[Run_N] - E[Run_M])}{\partial \pi} < 0$ under our assumption that $\delta_M > \delta_N$. In other words, an increase in the probability of being appointed mayor decreases the likelihood that an individual will run for office, and this effect is greater among the group that has a larger return to labour market experience. Finally, it is easy to see that part *iii.)* continues to hold.

A.2 Additional results

Table A.1: Probability to run for office: marginal effects, different interactions

| | All candidates | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Natives			
High school	0.00512***	0.00514***	0.00515***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
College	0.0170***	0.0171***	0.0174***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Postgraduate	0.0191***	0.0191***	0.0199***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-0.00539***	-0.00539***	-0.00537***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Immigrants			
High school	-0.00614***	-0.00615***	-0.00508***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
College	-0.0128***	-0.0128***	-0.0129***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Postgraduate	-0.0150***	-0.0151***	-0.0167***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.00491***	0.00490***	0.00560***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.041	0.042	0.043
Observations	7,427,645	7,427,645	7,427,645
FE	Muni and Year (sep.)	MuniXYear	MuniXYearXImm

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Individuals in the age group 24-63 and we pool 3 election years 2007, 2011 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Note: Each regression also includes age dummies for immigrants and natives, marital status and employment status dummies.

Table A.2: The direct returns to a political career, bolded

	7th decile		6th decile		8th decile	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Below $\underline{w}$						
Prob. mayor - *nat.*	-0.003	-0.002	-0.005	-0.004	0.013	0.014
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Prob. mayor - *imm.*	-0.407***	-0.410***	-0.385***	-0.385***	-0.435***	-0.441***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Above $\underline{w}$						
Prob. mayor - *nat.*	0.358***	0.357***	0.305***	0.304***	0.308***	0.304***
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Prob. mayor - *imm.*	0.069	0.163**	-0.003	0.081	0.159	0.256***
	(0.099)	(0.072)	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.098)	(0.069)
Rel. mayor wage - *nat.*	0.018**	0.021**	0.013	0.016*	0.029***	0.032***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Rel. mayor wage - *imm.*	0.031***	0.016*	0.031***	0.013	0.043***	0.031***
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Oslo excluded	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,276,500	5,308,010	6,276,500	5,308,010	6,276,500	5,308,010
Prob. bolded for *nat.*	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.238
Prob. bolded for *imm.*	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Individuals in the age group 24-63 and we pool 3 election years 2007, 2011 and 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Notes: Variables are standardized using national mean and standard deviation. Other controls include immigrant, education, gender, age, marital, employment and municipality population (5) dummies.Top n excluded refers to the number of largest cities (population-wise) excluded from the regression following this order: 1. Oslo, 2. Bergen, 3. Trondheim, 4. Stavanger, 5.Borum. Below and above $\underline{w}$ refers respectively to whether the mayor's relative average wage is below or above the 6th/7th/8th decile of the distribution of mayor wages computed for each election year separately. Probability to run rescaled between 0 and 100.The estimated coefficients are the marginal effects of each variable, separately for natives and immigrants.

Figure A.1: Probability of running for office by gender


(a) "Full lists"

(b) "Non-full lists"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office relative to males, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.2: Probability of running for office by age

(a) "Full lists"

(b) "Non-full lists"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each age group, relative to the baseline of 24-28, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.3: Probability of running for office by age

(a) "Full lists"

(b) "Non-full lists"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each age group, relative to the baseline of 24-28, separately for immigrants and natives (immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway).

Figure A.4: Probability of running for office by gender

(a) "Rural municipalities"

(b) "Urban municipalities"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office relative to males, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.5: Probability of running for office by age

marginal effects


(a) "Rural municipalities"

marginal effects

(b) "Urban municipalities"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each age group, relative to the baseline of 24-28, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.6: Probability of running for office by age

less than 10 years of experience

(a) "Rural municipalities"

less than 10 years of experience

(b) "Urban municipalities"

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each age group, relative to the baseline of 24-28, separately for immigrants and natives (immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway).

Figure A.7: Probability of running for office by party

(a) Centre Party

(b) Other parties

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.8: Probability of running for office by gender, by party

marginal effects

immigrants .... natives -----

(a) Labour Party

marginal effects

immigrants .... natives -----

(b) Centre Party

marginal effects

immigrants .... natives -----

(c) Conservative Party

marginal effects

immigrants .... natives -----

(d) Other parties

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each gender group, relative to males, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.9: Probability of running for office by age, by party


(a) Labour Party

(b) Centre Party

(c) Conservative Party

(d) Other parties

Source: Norwegian Population Register. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63 and pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). The figure shows the per cent increase in the probability of running for office for each age group, relative to the baseline of ages 24-28, separately for immigrants and natives.

Figure A.10: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by party type


(a) Bolded, credible parties

(b) Non-credible parties

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by gender. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.11: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by party type

(a) Bolded, credible parties

(b) Non-credible parties

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.12: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by party type


(a) Bolded, credible parties

(b) Non-credible parties

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age, where immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.13: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by labour market status


(a) Inactives

(b) In the labour force

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by gender. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.14: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by labour market status

(a) Inactives

(b) In the labour force

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.15: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by labour market status

(a) Inactives

(b) In the labour force

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age, where immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.16: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by language


(a) High proximity

(b) Low proximity

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by gender. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.17: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by language

(a) High proximity

(b) Low proximity

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.18: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by language


(a) High proximity

(b) Low proximity

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age, where immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.19: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by democracy in origin country


(a) Democracy

(b) Anocracy

(c) Autocracy

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by gender. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.20: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by democracy in origin country

(a) Democracy

(b) Anocracy

(c) Autocracy

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.21: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by democracy in origin country


(a) Democracy

(b) Anocracy

(c) Autocracy

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age, where immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.22: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by citizenship


(a) Norwegian citizens

(b) Foreign citizens

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by gender. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

Figure A.23: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by citizenship

(a) Norwegian citizens

(b) Foreign citizens

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.

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Figure A.24: Returns to labour market experience and the likelihood of running for office: Immigrant-native gaps by citizenship

(a) Norwegian citizens

(b) Foreign citizens

The figure reports on the left axis the difference in the returns to an additional year of Norwegian labour market experience between immigrants and natives by age, where immigrants have less than 10 years of experience in Norway. The right axis measures instead the difference between immigrants and natives in the percentage increase in the probability of running for office for each education group, relative to the baseline of at most compulsory education. Immigrants are foreign-born children of immigrant parents, excluding Nordic immigrants. We include only individuals in the age group 24-63, and we pool 3 elections (2007, 2011 and 2015). Source: Norwegian Population Register.